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impact that closing federal law and federal courthouse doors to
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose that you were a lawyer representing a plaintiff injured in
a foreign country by a defendant arguably subject to personal
jurisdiction in the United States. Where would you advise your client
to bring suit? Of course, that decision would be made by comparing
the substantive and procedural laws of various jurisdictions—such as
the foreign place of injury with the place of domicile of the
defendant—to determine where the most convenient and lawfavorable forum would be to bring your case.1 A rational litigant
would shop among the various potential fora for the forum where
1. If this was a contract claim, you might also have to evaluate whether the contract
has choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses and whether these clauses point to a
favorable forum (and law) for your client. Should those clauses be valid and enforceable,
you might not have much of a choice where you bring the suit. Should those clauses be
void or nonexistent, your evaluation of the case would be the same as in the main text.
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there is the highest likelihood of a favorable outcome and bring the
suit there so long as litigation funding supported that choice.2
At one time, your advice to the client would have probably been
in many (perhaps most) transnational cases: “Sue in the United
States.” As Lord Denning, arguably the most celebrated English
judge of the twentieth century,3 famously opined, “As a moth is
drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he can
only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune.”4 The
argument is that even in a world of increasing globalization, plaintiffs
would prefer to bring suit in the United States to take advantage of
favorable substantive and procedural law that presents far greater
potential for recovery than in other legal systems.5
There are several reasons why a plaintiff would want to bring suit
in a U.S. forum. First, U.S. substantive law is thought to be more
generous than the laws of other countries.6 Second, U.S. procedural
law—in particular, notice pleading, liberal discovery, and aggregate
(class action) litigation—provides plaintiffs substantial leverage in
pleading, proving, trying to a favorable verdict, and settling their
cases.7 Third, U.S. damages law—especially punitive damages and
substantial jury awards—present the potential for a windfall for
plaintiffs or, at a minimum, significant leverage to encourage
defendants to settle.8 For these and other reasons, a plaintiff in a
transnational case would be expected to choose a U.S. forum to bring
suit, if possible as a matter of jurisdiction, even in cases where the
harms complained of occurred abroad and even in cases where the
2. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 383 (2006)
(“The law regularly provides more than one authorized, legitimate forum in which a
litigant’s claims may be heard. To shop among those legitimate choices for the forum that
offers the potential for the most favorable outcome is the only rational decision under
rational choice theory and game theory because forum shopping maximizes the client’s
expected payoff.”).
3. J. Skelly Wright, Law and the Logic of Experience: Reflections on Denning,
Devlin, and Judicial Innovation in the British Context, 33 STAN. L. REV. 179, 180 (1980).
4. Smith Kline & French Labs., Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730 (C.A.) at 733
(Eng.).
5. See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Refracting Domestic and Global Choice-of-Forum
Doctrine Through the Lens of a Single Case, 2007 BYU L. REV. 959, 971 (2007).
6. See Russell J. Weintraub, Introduction to Symposium on International Forum
Shopping, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 463, 463 (2002) (“Typically our courts afford to foreign
plaintiffs injured abroad lower barriers to suit and higher recoveries than other available
forums would offer.”).
7. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Is Transnational Litigation a Distinct Field? The Persistence
of Exceptionalism in American Procedural Law, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 301, 338–40, 338
n.194 (2008).
8. See Roger P. Alford, Arbitrating Human Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505,
509, 511–12, 516 (2008).
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evidence is located abroad. Specifically, you might counsel your client
to sue in U.S. federal court and even under U.S. federal law, as
federal courts and federal law have generally been seen as
particularly hospitable to transnational cases.9
In today’s world of transnational litigation, your advice to the
client might be different. Generally speaking, U.S. federal courts are
increasingly reluctant to adjudicate transnational cases.10
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has made substantial refinements to
doctrines such as personal jurisdiction,11 forum non conveniens,12 and
the extraterritorial application of U.S. federal law13 that pose
substantial obstacles for filing transnational suits in U.S. federal
courts, especially under federal law.14 Indeed, upon filing a case in the
United States, a foreign plaintiff is particularly susceptible to having
her case dismissed by a U.S. federal court in favor of a foreign
forum.15 Similarly, the Supreme Court has also constricted pleading
doctrine16 and made it harder to certify class actions.17 Taken
together, these federal developments short-circuit many of the
reasons why a plaintiff in a transnational case would be drawn to U.S.
federal law and courts.
Perhaps no better examples exist of this restriction of federal
court access in transnational cases than the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum18 and Daimler AG v.

9. See Weintraub, supra note 6, at 463 (“The United States ranks first among the
world’s magnet forums.”).
10. See, e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional
Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1113 (2010); Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum
Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 483–84 (2011).
11. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2855 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011).
12. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429 (2007).
13. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 247 (2010).
14. One scholar has helpfully labeled these and similar doctrines as “transnational
litigation avoidance doctrines.” See Pamela K. Bookman, Once and Future U.S. Litigation,
in FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS AND THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM 35, 36–37
(Paul B. Stephan ed., 2014) (describing forum non conveniens, forum selection clauses,
comity, personal jurisdiction, and the political question doctrine as “transnational
litigation avoidance doctrines”).
15. See Donald Earl Childress III, Forum Conveniens: The Search for a Convenient
Forum in Transnational Cases, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 157, 165 (2012) (explaining the impact of
the forum non conveniens doctrine on foreign plaintiffs).
16. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555–56 (2007).
17. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011).
18. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
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Bauman.19 In Kiobel, the Court held that a Nigerian plaintiff could
not bring suit against a Dutch corporation under the Alien Tort
Statute (“ATS”)20 for alleged human rights violations occurring in
Nigeria.21 According to the Court, where the harms complained of
occurred entirely abroad, the ATS does not apply unless the alleged
tortious conduct “touch[es] and concern[s]” the territory of the
United States.22 In Bauman, the Court held that Daimler AG, a
German corporation, was not subject to general jurisdiction in
California in a case alleging tortious activities committed by a
subsidiary of Daimler AG in Argentina.23 Daimler AG was, according
to the Court, in no way “essentially at home” in California because of
its “slim contacts with the State [of California],” even though it had a
subsidiary there subject to general jurisdiction.24
These cases are just two examples of federal courts restricting
plaintiffs’ access to U.S. federal law and courts in transnational cases.
This emerging “restrictive ethos”25 to federal procedural and
substantive law in transnational cases impacts not only cases filed in
U.S. federal courts, which would be the expected outcome of such
decisions. Importantly, it also affects plaintiffs bringing transnational
cases in federal, state, and foreign courts generally. For instance,
some plaintiffs are engaging in domestic forum shopping and
intentionally avoiding federal procedural and substantive law by
seeking to plead transnational cases under state law, in some cases in
state courts in the very first instance.26 This forum selection raises
complex issues regarding the allocation of judicial powers between

19. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”).
21. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
22. Id.
23. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 762.
24. Id. at 760, 762.
25. See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 353, 368 (2010) (citing Iqbal and other recent cases as an example of an
efficiency-focused “restrictive ethos in procedure [that] appears ascendant and poised for
dominance”). I note that this restrictive ethos has been examined in significant detail in
the context of domestic litigation. See, e.g., Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management:
Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 729–30 (2010); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified
Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the
Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 291–92 (2013). This Article
explores that ethos in the context of transnational litigation.
26. Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the
Extraterritorial Effects of U.S. State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, 92 B.U. L. REV. 535, 539–40 (2012).
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federal and state courts in cases where foreign affairs might be
implicated.
Even more interesting, some plaintiffs now actively avoid U.S.
federal procedural and substantive law altogether. Instead, they file
their claims in U.S. courts under foreign law and, in some cases, file
claims in the first instance under foreign law in foreign courts.27 This
raises an important question: Should U.S. courts take account of this
development as they apply domestic legal doctrine in transnational
cases, and, if so, how?
Notably, plaintiffs engaging in transnational forum selection are
seeing significant success filing suits abroad. On January 30, 2013, for
instance, a trial court in The Hague announced that it had entered a
judgment against Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria,
a member of the Royal Dutch Shell group of companies, for
violations of Nigerian law for harms arising from an oil spill in
Nigeria.28 According to one commentator, this case “constitutes the
first time that a Dutch multinational has been sued before a civil
court in The Netherlands in connection with allegations of damage
caused abroad by a subsidiary and appears to be part of a trend”
whereby plaintiffs “from the developing world turn[] to the courts in
developed countries for redress against multinationals.”29 In years
past, this case would have been a prime candidate for filing in the
United States, especially under the ATS,30 as the plaintiffs did in
Kiobel.31 Today, it appears there is a comparative advantage in filing
such cases in foreign fora, especially in Europe.32
Plaintiffs seek out nonfederal law and fora because those fora are
engaged in forum competition to adjudicate transnational cases.
Foreign courts are developing their law, both procedural and

27. Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law
Competition in Securities Law After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 132, 140 (2012).
28. David Jolly & Stanley Reed, Mixed Decision for Shell in Nigeria Oil Spill Suits,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/business/global/dutchcourt-rules-shell-partly-responsible-for-nigerian-spills.html?pagewanted=all.
29. Roger Alford, Dutch Court Issues Mixed Ruling on Shell’s Liability for Nigerian
Environmental Claim, OPINIOJURIS (Feb. 5, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/02/05/dutchcourt-issues-mixed-ruling-on-shells-liability-for-nigerian-environmental-claim/.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Doe v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 40–41 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
31. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1660 (2013).
32. Michael D. Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S. Courts: A
Comparative Scorecard, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 127, 129 (2013).
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substantive, to encourage forum shopping into their courts.33 We are
thus at the very beginning stage of a brave new world of transnational
litigation where domestic and foreign courts compete through
domestic and foreign law, both substantive and procedural, to
regulate transnational activities as part of a transnational law market.
This new world of transnational litigation is largely driven by
private parties and their lawyers, who are forum shopping for
favorable substantive and procedural law. These efforts are also part
of an ongoing movement not only to file transnational cases in U.S.
state and foreign courts, but also to influence legal change in those
fora.34 For instance, there is a movement in Europe to overcome the
traditional reluctance to aggregate litigation in favor of allowing U.S.
class-action-like devices.35 There are also increasing damages awards
in foreign courts that similarly show at least some export of
traditionally American robust systems for recovery.36 In short, we
now have a transnational law market where domestic and foreign
courts compete to adjudicate transnational cases and where private
parties and their lawyers engage in efforts designed to encourage such
competition. We are in the midst of a brave new world of
transnational litigation where U.S. and foreign courts compete
through their legal regimes for transnational cases.
This Article explores the burgeoning brave new world of
transnational litigation. The Article is divided into four parts. In Part
I, the Article explains the emergence of a law market for
transnational cases. The transnational law market concept identified
herein illustrates how the transnational movement of goods, people,
and commerce has created a transnational movement of law, both
procedural and substantive. Part II examines the market in action. By
analyzing the impact that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Morrison
v. National Australia Bank37 (involving transnational securities fraud)
and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (involving transnational torts)
have had on forum and substantive law choice, the Article shows how
restricting access to federal courts encourages the migration of
33. See, e.g., R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
LAW AND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 7–8 (2011).
34. See generally, e.g., Mark A. Behrens et al., Global Litigation Trends, 17 MICH. ST.
J. INT’L L. 165, 192–93 (2009) (highlighting European fora that are now instituting forms
of punitive damages and multi-claimant litigation).
35. S.I. Strong, Regulatory Litigation in the European Union: Does the U.S. Class
Action Have a New Analogue?, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 899, 912 (2012).
36. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(detailing a multi-billion dollar judgment entered against a U.S. company in Ecuador).
37. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
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transnational cases to other courts in search of more favorable law.
Part III explores the contraction of federal substantive and
procedural law generally and explains how that retrenchment further
informs and enables the transnational law market. Part IV proposes a
normative view of transnational litigation. Key to this view is that, as
the name “transnational” denotes, cases touching on transnational
legal issues should be subject to increased transnational regulation
and cooperation between governments in light of sovereign interests.
I. THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW MARKET
Before examining the federal doctrinal landscape that
encourages forum shopping in transnational cases, it is important to
reconceptualize the ways in which litigants and courts interact in such
cases. In this Part, the Article explains that transnational litigants are
active participants in a transnational law market. This Part explores
the development of the transnational law market in three sections. It
begins by describing the market for transnational law and identifying
the conditions that make transnational forum selection possible. It
next focuses on the strategic choices made by litigants in transnational
cases in response to the substantive and procedural laws provided by
different fora. After exploring these choices, this Part illustrates how
litigant choice operates within a transnational law market where U.S.
and foreign courts compete through their substantive and procedural
laws for transnational cases. Understanding the operation of the
transnational law market provides context for the exploration of how
that market will respond to restrictive federal substantive and
procedural law, which will be analyzed in Parts II and III.
A. Is There a Market for Transnational Law?
It is not surprising that litigants in transnational cases engage in
strategic forum-selection behavior to maximize their chances of legal
recovery.38 As one might recall from the first year of law school,
substantial time is spent acculturating lawyers to the benefits of forum
choice. In one’s study of civil procedure, for instance, students
examine in exhausting detail doctrines such as subject matter
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, the Erie doctrine, and venue that
impact forum choice and intersect with forum selection. While forum
shopping is the equivalent of a legal “dirty word,” it is, in fact, “only a
pejorative way of saying that, if you offer a plaintiff a choice of
38. Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Forum
Shopping: Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367, 1372 (2004).
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jurisdictions, he will naturally choose the one in which he thinks his
case can be most favorably presented; this should be a matter neither
for surprise nor for indignation.”39 Federal civil procedure doctrines
are designed to encourage the just and fair resolution of cases in light
of the fact that parties engage in strategic behavior to find the forum
where their likelihood of success is the greatest.40
In the United States, especially in a purely domestic case,41 forum
selection is a question of “where” a certain case should be localized.
For instance, can a Virginia corporate defendant that does substantial
business in California be sued in California for a tort committed in
Virginia against a California domiciliary? At first blush, this would
seem to be a question of personal jurisdiction—namely, whether the
Virginia defendant has the requisite contacts with California to
permit suit there.42 However, this can also be viewed a question of
venue because if the Virginia defendant cannot be sued in California
it most certainly can be sued in Virginia based on general
jurisdiction.43 The case will be localized somewhere in the United
States. “Where” in the United States is the only question.
Importantly, there is a strategic question embedded within this
jurisdictional question: Where would the plaintiff have the best
chance of recovery under governing law? In other words, in which
forum would the plaintiff have the best chance of success applying
state choice-of-law rules to determine the substantive law
applicable?44 Similarly, to the extent different fora employ different
39. The Atlantic Star, [1974] A.C. 436 (H.L.) at 471 (Eng.).
40. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439 (1986) (“Sobered by the fate of the Field
Code, Dean Clark and the other drafters of the Federal Rules set out to devise a
procedural system that would install what may be labelled the ‘liberal ethos,’ in which the
preferred disposition is on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure through
discovery.”).
41. By “purely domestic case,” I mean one that involves a U.S. plaintiff, a U.S.
defendant, and allegations of harms occurring in the United States.
42. The test is now a modification of the well-known International Shoe test: a
defendant must have the requisite minimum contacts with the forum state such that the
assertion of jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
43. See Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Torts Under the Alien
Tort Statute and Beyond: An Economic Analysis, 100 GEO. L.J. 2161, 2193 (2012) (“The
rules governing personal jurisdiction and venue usually pose minimal obstacles to
plaintiffs seeking to bring cases against U.S. defendants. Almost invariably, there will exist
some state or federal jurisdiction (typically many) where a U.S. business defendant is
amenable to suit.”).
44. See Whytock, supra note 10, at 488 (noting the connection between choice of law
and forum shopping). As should be obvious, there is a domestic law market as well. See
generally ERIN O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009)
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procedural laws—for instance, notice pleading or plausibility
pleading—the litigant will have to take these matters into account as
well when choosing the optimal forum.
Choice of law enters the equation because the several states have
different choice-of-law rules. For instance, Virginia will, with limited
exceptions, apply the law of the place of injury to the case (in this
example, Virginia law).45 California, however, might apply Virginia
substantive law, or it might apply California substantive law.46 To the
extent Virginia and California substantive law materially differ,
parties have an incentive to forum shop for the most favorable law.
Furthermore, Virginia and California procedural law may differ. At a
minimum, the background of the judge and jury will be different as
between Virginia and California. These differences in substantive and
procedural law encourage a plaintiff to shop between the laws and
courts of Virginia and California, both federal and state, to identify
the forum where the likelihood of success is the greatest. Principles of
personal jurisdiction constrain this choice.
While a plaintiff might seek a California court (federal or state)
in hopes of finding a forum where her likelihood of recovery is
greatest, that decision can be short-circuited by a defendant’s reverse
forum shopping.47 For example, if the plaintiff can file the case in a
California state court because there is personal jurisdiction there,
then the defendant may remove the case from state to federal court to
limit some of the strategic advantages of filing in the state court.48 A
defendant might also move to transfer from one federal court to
another.49
As the preceding paragraphs explain, plaintiffs and defendants
both engage in forum shopping for the forum where their relative

(acknowledging that a law market exists amongst U.S. state and federal jurisdictions). The
concern here is with the transnational aspects of the law market.
45. E.g., Jones v. R.S. Jones & Assocs., 431 S.E.2d 33, 34 (Va. 1993) (holding that the
settled law in Virginia is to adhere to the place of the wrong standard).
46. E.g., Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 934 (Cal. 2006)
(holding that conflicts of law are resolved “by applying the law of the state whose interest
would be more impaired if its law were not applied”).
47. See Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens
in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28
TEX. INT’L L.J. 501, 525 (1993) (“In reality, plaintiffs engage in forum shopping and
defendants engage in reverse forum shopping, each seeking to turn to their own advantage
the laws and procedures in the respective forums.”).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012) (permitting a nonresident defendant to remove a case
from state court to an appropriate federal court).
49. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1631 (2012) (allowing a change of venue for the
convenience of parties and witnesses or for want of jurisdiction).
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chances of success on the merits are greatest. In so doing, however,
various procedural doctrines level the playing field to prevent a party
from using the rules of the system to create an excessive and unfair
litigation advantage.50 Importantly, domestic forum shopping is
frequently about choice of law and convenience to the parties,51 as
relative procedural uniformity throughout the several states discounts
many of the reasons for domestic forum shopping.52 Transnational
cases, however, present different strategic choices for litigants.53 To
understand why a plaintiff would be drawn to U.S. courts in a
transnational case, one must understand the traditional advantages
offered to a foreign plaintiff by U.S. substantive and procedural law.
First, U.S. courts allow extensive pretrial discovery controlled by
the parties and not the court. In most other legal systems, pretrial
discovery is limited.54 As such, U.S. courts give plaintiffs significant
advantages to force settlements through the threat of discovery.55
Such discovery also gives plaintiffs a greater ability to prove their
cases by giving them access to information.56 Second, it is believed
that U.S. courts grant and approve higher damages awards than
foreign courts, particularly in cases that are tried to a jury.57 U.S. law
recognizes categories of compensatory damages, such as damages for
emotional distress or pain and suffering, that are not generally
50. See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The
Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1918 (2008)
(describing the various responses to forum shopping in the history of American procedural
law).
51. Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative
Shareholder Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
1753, 1791 (2012).
52. See Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards,
and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1432 (2008) (describing uniformity
of procedural law in the United States).
53. See Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping,
International and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 559, 567–68 (2002) (noting the
impact of choice-of-law doctrine on international forum shopping and arguing that it is
stronger than the impact on domestic forum shopping).
54. E.g., John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 823, 830–31 (1985) (explaining the differences between discovery in the United
States and Germany).
55. See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 551 (2010) (analyzing this belief through empirical
data).
56. Arthur R. Miller, McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L.
REV. 465, 474 (2012).
57. See Russell J. Weintraub, Methods for Resolving Conflicts-of-Laws Problems in
Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 129, 152–53 (stating that foreign parties flock to
the United States for a variety of reasons, including “the American jury and its openhearted generosity”).
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recognized abroad.58 U.S. law also provides for punitive damages,
which are rejected in most other legal systems.59 Third, U.S. courts
permit class actions that cannot be brought as aggregate cases in other
countries.60 In these cases, which can involve many thousands of class
members, potential liability for defendants is amplified, providing
significant incentives for settlement. Finally, U.S. lawyers are able and
willing to represent plaintiffs on contingent-fee arrangements. Such
arrangements are generally not permitted in other countries.61
Plaintiffs in the United States are also not subject generally to a
“loser pays” system, allowing lawyers and plaintiffs to bring claims
that may not be successful without the fear of bearing both sides of
litigation costs.62
For each of these reasons, U.S. courts, both federal and state,
present a compelling choice for plaintiffs in transnational cases. These
substantive and procedural advantages also illustrate why defendants
would prefer to avoid litigation in the United States.
Perhaps no better example of the lengths that a defendant will go
to escape U.S. courts and law (and the lengths a plaintiff will go to
escape foreign courts and law) is presented in the classic case of Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,63 which applied the forum non conveniens
doctrine in the transnational context.64 In that case, a representative
of the estates of several Scottish citizens brought a wrongful death
action in California state court against two American defendants who
had manufactured the engine and propellers of a plane that crashed in
Scotland.65 All victims of the crash were Scottish citizens, as were
their next-of-kin.66 A Scottish lawyer referred the next-of-kin to a
plaintiff’s air-crash lawyer in California, who arranged to have a
58. See Stephen D. Sugarman, A Comparative Law Look at Pain and Suffering
Awards, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 399, 418 (2006) (finding quantitatively that U.S median
recoveries for non-compensatory damages are “enormously larger” than in European
courts).
59. See John Y. Gotanda, Essay, Charting Developments Concerning Punitive
Damages: Is the Tide Changing?, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 510 (2007) (“Most
civil law countries limit recovery of damages in private actions to compensatory
damages.”).
60. See generally Tiana Leia Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the European Union,
28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 141, 173 (2010) (discussing the differences between the U.S. and
European legal and procedural backgrounds).
61. Daniel Klerman, Personal Jurisdiction and Product Liability, 85 S. CAL. L. REV.
1551, 1555 (2012).
62. JOHN G. FLEMING, THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESS 187–234 (1988).
63. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
64. Id. at 238.
65. Id. at 239–40.
66. Id.
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probate court in Los Angeles appoint his legal assistant, Gaynell
Reyno, as the administratrix of the estates of some of the deceased
passengers.67 Reyno, an American citizen domiciled in California,
instituted wrongful death litigation in state court in Los Angeles.68
The defendants removed the case to a California federal court
and then transferred the case to a Pennsylvania federal court, where
they then moved for dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds.69
The district court granted dismissal in favor of a Scottish forum and
the Third Circuit reversed, finding that dismissal was inappropriate
because Scottish law was less favorable to the plaintiff’s case.70 Even
though the plaintiff would be disadvantaged by limited recovery
before a Scottish court, the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit
and held, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, that various public and
private interest factors could displace a foreign plaintiff’s choice of a
U.S. forum.71
What makes this case such a good example of the transnational
law market is how it illustrates the ways in which both plaintiffs and
defendants engage in forum shopping. For the plaintiff, California
state courts were chosen as the forum to bring their case because the
substantive and procedural law of California was significantly more
favorable to them than the substantive and procedural law of
Scotland.72 For the defendants, it was understandable that they would
want to have the case heard in Scotland, as that is where the accident
happened. They also wanted to have the case heard in Scotland in
light of the fact that Reyno would not be able to pursue the cause of
action there, because only next-of-kin could bring wrongful death
actions.73 Additionally, “the plaintiff’s lawyer could not practice law
in Great Britain,” the “litigation in Scotland would not include
American-style discovery,” and, perhaps most significantly, “Scottish
courts would not permit recovery of damages for anguish and would
not employ American tort theories of liability.”74
It was probably clear to all involved that a forum non conveniens
dismissal would effectively seal victory for Piper and Hartzell. Indeed,
after the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit, “apparently no
67.
68.
971–72.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
For a wonderful description of the case, see Richard D. Freer, supra note 5, at
Piper, 454 U.S. at 238–40.
Id. at 238.
Id.
See id. at 240.
Id.
Freer, supra note 5, at 972.
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suit was ever brought against the American manufacturers in Great
Britain concerning this crash; evidently no lawyer thought the
potential recovery worth the effort.”75
This case illustrates why plaintiffs would want to forum shop into
the United States in this particular case. The case, however, also
shows how fora may compete for legal business. For California to
permit such suits even when it has limited or no interest in the case
illustrates that California is competing for legal business by creating
opportunities for suits that do not exist elsewhere. For courts and
litigants to view a legal system in this way illuminates that law is more
than just a framework for adjudication; it is a market. Defining this
transnational law market is the subject of the next section.
B.

Defining the Transnational Law Market

In light of the above considerations, transnational litigation can
be viewed as operating within a market for goods, where the goods
are legal recovery. As Erin O’Hara and the late Larry Ribstein
explain in their foundational book The Law Market, the market for
law contains the following elements:
First, there must be some significant demand for alternative
laws as evidenced by parties’ ability and willingness to take the
necessary steps to avoid undesired laws and to select the laws of
other states. Second, some states must be willing and able to
supply the desired laws. Third, political forces must respond to
enhanced choice . . . . Fourth, federal statutory or constitutional
law may play a role in the competition by either facilitating or
hindering party choice.76
Put in slightly different terms, on the demand side, plaintiffs seek law
that meets their need for convenient, swift, and substantial recovery.
As explained above in Part I.A, we have already seen the ways in
which forum shopping illustrates the demand side of the transnational
law market.
However, there is another side to the story—the supply side.
States may compete to offer legal actors what they want. This means
that parties engage in forum shopping in light of the fact that different
jurisdictions compete for law and legal services. Forum shopping by
litigants and forum competition by legal systems go hand in hand.77
75. Id. (citations omitted).
76. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 44, at 166.
77. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A
Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551, 1553 (2003) (understanding markets
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There would be no reason for a party to undertake the Herculean
efforts to shop between various jurisdictions if fora did not craft
different legal rules. Different legal rules may be the result of
happenstance in legal culture or concerted efforts on the part of fora
to compete for legal business.78 They may also be the result of judges
in individual cases seeking justice for plaintiffs through expansive
application of legal doctrines or even the result of judges wishing to
cultivate prestige or reputation in hearing such cases.79 These reasons
create a supply side in the transnational law market.
Historically, the potential for a transnational law market was
quite limited. A plaintiff injured in one nation would only have the
law and the courts of that nation, regardless of their benefits or
disadvantages, to bring her case. This was so because travel and
financial limitations constrained a plaintiff’s ability to file a case in a
foreign jurisdiction. In today’s world of increasing globalization, there
is significant movement of goods, people, and services across borders.
Transnational litigation “is now a sophisticated multi-billion dollar
industry[] driven by the globalization of business and the possibility of
securing an enormous money judgment against a multinational
corporation.”80
Today, a party can forum shop for law transnationally in the
same way that it would shop for any other good or service.81 Indeed, a
party might even be encouraged to forum shop because third parties
engage in litigation financing.82 Litigation financing enables forum
competition by increasing the mobility of the parties and their ability
to shop for law.83 For example, a plaintiff injured in Nigeria by a
Nigerian corporation would be expected to bring her case in Nigeria
under Nigerian substantive and procedural law. Today, that same

“requires an understanding of both supply and demand conditions in order to identify the
resulting equilibrium”).
78. See, e.g., Daniel Klerman & Greg Reily, Forum Selling 8 (Univ. S. Cal. Ctr. for L.
and Soc. Sci., Working Paper No. 14-44, 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2538857.
79. See id. at 25, 38.
80. Gregory H. Shill, Ending Judgment Arbitrage: Jurisdictional Competition and the
Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the United States, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 459,
502 (2013).
81. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 44, at 1.
82. Roger Parloff, Have You Got a Piece of This Lawsuit?, FORTUNE/CNNMONEY
(June 28, 2011, 6:06 PM), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/28/have-you-got-apiece-of-this-lawsuit-2/.
83. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class
Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306 (2011)
(providing an overview of this phenomenon in the context of transnational class actions).
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party may be able to bring suit against a Nigerian domiciliary in
another country where that domiciliary has contacts or where its
agents and affiliates have contacts,84 especially if the party can obtain
litigation financing.85
The basic idea is that “[j]urisdictions compete to offer legal rules
and adjudication procedures that attract users.”86 The jurisdiction
benefits from this competition by “franchise and other taxes, fees for
lawyers and other professionals, private sector opportunities for
government officials and judges, and collateral benefits for other
businesses in the jurisdiction such as banks and broker-dealers.”87 To
return again to the Dutch example, the Dutch courts must signal that
they are open and willing to hear cases involving transnational torts.
In other words, they must show plaintiffs that they will supply
recovery if it is sought there. In sum, litigant demand and
jurisdictional supply connect to help the transnational litigant localize
her case.
Legal and political forces giving plaintiffs enhanced forum choice
also play a role in the transnational law market.88 The next Part
investigates these areas.
II. THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW MARKET IN ACTION
This Part illustrates the development of the transnational law
market by examining recent court decisions closing U.S. federal
courthouse doors to transnational cases. It examines the operation of
that market through the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v.
National Australia Bank, which held that the anti-fraud provisions of
federal securities laws do not apply to allegations of fraud occurring
on foreign exchanges.89 After explaining that decision and its
aftermath, which encouraged the filing of securities claims in state
and foreign fora, this Part applies the transnational law market
concept to other areas of law. As to the ATS in particular, this Part
points to the impact that the Supreme Court’s recently issued decision
84. David Jolly & Stanley Reed, Mixed Decision for Shell in Nigeria Oil Spill Suits,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/business/global/dutchcourt-rules-shell-partly-responsible-for-nigerian-spills.html?pagewanted=all.
85. See, e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of Third-Party Financing on
Transnational Litigation, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 159, 161–63 (2011); Maya Steinitz,
Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268,
1282 (2011).
86. Kaal & Painter, supra note 27, at 144.
87. Id.
88. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 44, at 166.
89. 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010).
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in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, which limited the ability of
foreign plaintiffs to bring transnational tort claims in the United
States for injuries occurring in a foreign country,90 may have on the
transnational law market.
A. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Federal Law
A key part of the transnational law market is that “political
forces must respond to enhanced choice” and that “federal statutory
or constitutional law may play a role in the [law market] by either
facilitating or hindering party choice.”91 This subpart describes how
the Supreme Court has responded to the transnational law market in
interpreting the federal securities laws by holding that those laws, and
federal law in general, are presumed not to apply extraterritorially. In
so doing, this subpart is divided into three sections. First, it describes
the presumption against extraterritoriality. Second, it examines the
presumption’s application in the Morrison case. Third, it examines the
impact that case has had on the filing of transnational securities
claims. Parts II.B and II.C then take up the question of the Morrison
decision’s impact on other federal laws.
1. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Congress clearly has the power to enact legislation that applies to
conduct outside the United States.92 However, courts seek to construe
ambiguous federal statutes to avoid “unreasonable interference with
the sovereign authority of other nations”93 that would result from the
extraterritorial application of federal law. Courts have developed a
presumption that U.S. federal law is not to apply extraterritorially
absent a clear indication of congressional intent to the contrary.94
“[U]nless there is the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly
expressed,” in “the language [of] the relevant Act,” federal courts
presume a statute does not apply to actions arising abroad.95 The
presumption against extraterritoriality “serves to protect against
90. 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
91. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 44, at 166.
92. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“Congress
has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United
States.”). This view comports with international law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1986) (noting that a state has
prescriptive jurisdiction over its own nationals and conduct that threatens its national
security or is intended to have an effect within its territory).
93. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).
94. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
95. Id. (citation omitted).
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unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations
which could result in international discord.”96
The presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S.
federal law has a long pedigree. In an opinion written by Justice
Joseph Story in the early 1800s, holding that federal customs statutes
could not be extended to foreign vessels outside U.S. waters, the
Supreme Court explained that “[t]he laws of no nation can justly
extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its own
citizens.”97 Reaffirming this view in the early 1900s with a slightly
different formulation, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. observed, in
refusing to apply the Sherman Act to the actions of a U.S. company in
Costa Rica, that there was a “general and almost universal
rule . . . that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”98
In the late twentieth century, after some years of uncertainty,99 the
Supreme Court, in an opinion by then-Chief Justice Rehnquist,
rejecting the application of Title VII to alleged employment
discrimination against an American citizen occurring abroad,
resuscitated the doctrine in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Company (Aramco).100 The Court explained that it is a “longstanding
principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.”101 This limitation exists because
“unless there is an affirmative intention of the Congress clearly
expressed” to give extraterritorial statutory effect “we must presume
it is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.”102 Based on these
cases, the presumption does not apply where there is “an affirmative
intention of the Congress clearly expressed” to extend the statute
extraterritorially.103
The presumption requires that Congress, rather than the courts,
address any extraterritorial application of U.S. law in the first
instance:

96. Id.
97. The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370 (1824).
98. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
99. See, e.g., Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 384 (1959);
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 573 (1953).
100. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
101. Id. at 248.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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For us to run interference in such a delicate field of
international relations there must be present the affirmative
intention of the Congress clearly expressed. It alone has the
facilities necessary to make fairly such an important policy
decision where the possibilities of international discord are so
evident and retaliative action so certain.104
The field is “delicate” because application of U.S. law to conduct on
foreign soil “creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign
nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial
affairs.”105 Because “the presumption [against extraterritoriality] has a
foundation broader than the desire to avoid conflict with the laws of
other nations,”106 it is not limited to situations where “there is a risk of
conflict between the American statute and a foreign law.”107
The presumption is, however, simple to state but hard to
operationalize because what it means to be an extraterritorial
application of U.S. law is uncertain, especially when a U.S.
domiciliary or some conduct or effect in the United States is at issue
in a case. In other words, the very first question for a court to resolve
is whether there is an extraterritoriality problem presented by the
case at all. The next section explores how courts apply the
presumption today.
2. Applying the Presumption: Morrison v. National Australia Bank
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the Supreme Court
addressed the extraterritorial reach of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, specifically section 10(b) of that Act and Rule 10b-5, which
create liability for fraudulent activities in connection with securities.108
National Australia Bank (“NAB”) was headquartered in Australia
and its shares traded on the Australian Securities Exchange as well as
other foreign exchanges.109 NAB had American Depository Receipts

104. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957); see also, e.g.,
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21–22 (1963)
(acknowledging that Congress must give U.S. courts express authority to decide certain
matters regarding international maritime law).
105. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004); see also,
e.g., Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (asserting the presumption that Congressional legislation is
meant only to apply within the territorial United States “serves to protect against
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in
international discord”).
106. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 174 (1993).
107. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
108. Id. at 261–65. Personal jurisdiction was apparently not raised before the courts. Id.
109. Id. at 251.
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(“ADRs”) listed on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”).110
NAB purchased HomeSide Lending, Inc., a Florida mortgage
servicing company, which received fees for servicing mortgages.111
The future income from the servicing contracts was calculated into
NAB’s balance sheet.112 However, in July 2001, NAB announced that
it would be taking a $450 million write-down based on the decreased
value of those estimates.113 In September of that same year, NAB
took another write-down of $1.75 billion.114 Following those writedowns, NAB’s share price fell substantially.115
Seeking to avail themselves of favorable U.S. law, a class of
Australian plaintiffs, who purchased shares of NAB on an Australian
stock exchange, brought suit under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
alleging that NAB “knowingly used unreasonably optimistic
valuation assumptions or methodologies” in their calculation of the
revenue the mortgage servicing fees would bring in.116 The plaintiffs
sued NAB and other defendants in New York federal court and
claimed, under then-existing Second Circuit precedent, that the
involvement of the U.S. subsidiary justified the application of section
10(b).117
The district court dismissed the case on the basis that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because the acts in the United States were
“at most, a link in the chain of a scheme that culminated abroad.”118
On appeal, the Second Circuit also dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under its “conduct” and “effects” tests.119 These
tests were the predominant approach for analyzing the extraterritorial
application of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws
up until the Morrison decision.120
The “effects” test, first announced in Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook,121 looked to whether the wrongful conduct had a
substantial effect within the United States or on a U.S. citizen.122 The
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 252.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 2008).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 172.
119. Id. at 171–76.
120. See Merrit B. Fox, Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 1173, 1232 (2012).
121. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
122. Id. at 206–09.
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“conduct” test accepted an extraterritorial reach of the securities laws
if foreign investors were harmed by conduct arising from the United
States.123 Applying these tests, the Second Circuit determined that
there was not subject matter jurisdiction because the acts occurring in
the United States did not comprise “the heart of the alleged fraud.”124
According to the Second Circuit, the heart of the fraud was
Australia.125
Before the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argued that the
language of section 10(b) overcame the presumption against
extraterritoriality.126 Speaking for the Court, Justice Scalia’s opinion
found on the merits127 that no statutory language expressed
Congress’s clear intention to have section 10(b) apply outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.128 The Court rejected the
“conduct” and “effects” test and instead opted to adopt a
transactional approach.129 In order for 10(b) to apply, the security
must be listed on a domestic (U.S.) exchange or the transaction must
be domestic.130 Therefore, a valid 10(b) claim can arise only for shares
traded on a U.S. exchange or a transaction occurring within the
United States.131 Since NAB shares were not listed on a domestic
exchange, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6).132
Importantly, the language of the opinion clearly expands the
presumption against extraterritoriality to all federal statutes.
According to the Court, “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of
an extraterritorial application, it has none.”133 Thus, for any federal
statute to overcome this presumption, Congress must clearly state its
intention for the statute to apply abroad.
This statement of the presumption presents a question at the
very heart of the case: When are the securities laws (or any other
federal statute) being applied extraterritorially? For instance, what if
123. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336–37 (2d Cir.
1972).
124. Morrison, 547 F.3d at 175–77.
125. Id.
126. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 262–64 (2010).
127. By resolving the case on the merits, the Court disclaimed that this was a matter of
subject matter jurisdiction, thus continuing a recent trend to separate subject matter
jurisdiction from the merits.
128. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 264–65.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 266–67.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 273.
133. Id. at 255.
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a major portion of the fraudulent activity occurred in the United
States even though it was directed to Australia? In fact, the plaintiffs
in Morrison argued as much. The plaintiffs “contend[ed] that they
[sought] no more than domestic application anyway, since Florida is
where HomeSide and its senior executives engaged in the deceptive
conduct of manipulating HomeSide’s financial models,” and because
other misleading statements were made in Florida.134
To answer this argument, the Court provided an additional gloss
on the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law
by requiring courts to look to the “focus” of the statute they are
applying to determine its reach. In the securities context, the Court
held that “the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where
the deception originated, but upon the purchases and sales of
securities in the United States.”135 The Court then turned to the
language of the Exchange Act, observing that “the objects of the
statute’s solicitude” were “transactions in securities listed on domestic
exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities.”136
According to the Court, “[i]t is those transactions that the statute
seeks to regulate [and] it is parties or prospective parties to those
transactions that the statute seeks to protect.”137
In sum, the Court acknowledged that plaintiffs had alleged some
U.S. activity, but this did not make their proposed application of
10(b) domestic rather than extraterritorial. In the Court’s view, “it is a
rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all
contact with the territory of the United States. But the presumption
against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog
indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is
involved in the case.”138
The benefit of the Court’s approach is the advantage of a brightline rule as opposed to a case-specific approach. However, requiring
courts to look at the “focus” of each federal statute in the process of
conducting an extraterritoriality analysis presents the possibility of
circuit splits developing in many areas of law where the
extraterritorial application of federal law is challenged. This is so
because different federal courts might view the focus of a federal
statute differently, depending on the context of the case. As such, the
Supreme Court has not given the final word on the extraterritoriality
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 266.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 267.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 266.
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analysis, and there is reason to believe that the Court will have to
take up other extraterritoriality cases in the years to come. Litigation
following Morrison confirms that a statute’s “focus” can be hard to
ascertain.
3. Morrison’s Impact on Transnational Securities Cases
Following the Morrison decision, another round of forum
shopping in transnational securities cases began. In the Morrison case
itself, the plaintiffs refiled their action in Australia. The case was later
settled.139 In other securities cases, plaintiffs sought to escape the
Court’s precise holding by pleading that there was a U.S. nexus under
federal law or that a cause of action was available under U.S. state
law. Plaintiffs also began to seek out foreign fora. Each of these
developments is discussed in turn.
Federal Law. Plaintiffs focused generally on two different
theories to escape the presumption against extraterritoriality
announced in Morrison when pleading federal law in securities fraud
cases. The first strategy focused on shares being “listed” on a
domestic exchange, even though they are not traded domestically.
Under Morrison, section 10(b) applies to “the purchase or sale of a
security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or
sale of any other security in the United States.”140 One way to read
Morrison is that if shares are listed in the United States, then the
statute is not being applied extraterritorially and the presumption
does not apply.141 Under the listing theory, plaintiffs argued that any
security that is registered and listed with a domestic exchange
survives Morrison.142 However, a number of courts have rejected this
interpretation.143

139. Email from George T. Conway III, Wachtel, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to author
(Jan. 28, 2014) (on file with author) (email from counsel for NAB confirming the
settlement).
140. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273.
141. Other theories have also been put forward. See, e.g., Wu v. Stomber, 883 F. Supp.
2d 233, 240 (D.D.C. 2012) (arguing that the EURONEXT exchange is actually American
because it is owned by a Delaware corporation), affirmed by 750 F.3d 994 (D.C. Cir. 2014);
MVP Asset Mgmt. v. Vestbirk, No. 2:10-cv-02483-GEB-CKD, 2012 WL 2873371, at *5–6
(E.D. Cal. July 12, 2012) (arguing that transferring funds between New York-based
banking institutions establishes a domestic transaction).
142. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
143. See, e.g., In re Royal Bank of Scotland Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327,
330–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Vivendi, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 525; In re Infineon Techs. AG
Sec. Litig., No. C 04-04156 JW, 2011 WL 7121006, at *3, *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011).
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The second strategy sought to create an implication of a domestic
transaction when the purchase order is submitted from the United
States even though the ultimate purchase occurs on a foreign
exchange. Here again, plaintiffs sought to escape the presumption by
pleading a domestic condition. The main argument surrounds the
application of the Morrison language holding that section 10(b) suits
are appropriate “whether the purchase or sale is made in the United
States, or involves a security listed on a domestic exchange.”144
However, many courts have held that “[section] 10(b) would not
extend to foreign securities trades executed on foreign exchanges
even if purchased or sold by American investors, and even if some
aspects of the transaction occurred in the United States.”145 District
courts appear disinclined to subject purchases on foreign exchanges to
section 10(b) merely on the basis of a purchase order signed in the
United States.146 However, a recent court of appeals decision has
cracked the door open for domestic plaintiffs.147
To be clear, plaintiffs also face substantial procedural obstacles
to pleading transnational securities actions in federal courts when the
fraud complained of occurred abroad. In Absolute Activist Value
Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto,148 for instance, the Second Circuit held
that “to sufficiently allege a domestic securities transaction in
securities not listed on a domestic exchange,” a plaintiff must “allege
facts suggesting that irrevocable liability was incurred or title
transferred within the United States.”149
District courts within and outside the Second Circuit have begun
to apply the Absolute Activist test. For example, the district court in
Bayerische Landesbank v. Barclays Capital, Inc.150 denied a motion to
dismiss, finding the plaintiffs made “at least a plausible showing that
[the notes at issue] . . . were purchased by the New York branch,”
which satisfied the issue of whether “irrevocable liability was incurred
144. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269–70.
145. Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 625–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
146. Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reins. Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d
166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
147. See generally Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60 (2d
Cir. 2012) (holding that transactions involving securities that are not traded on a domestic
exchange are domestic, and thus subject to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, if irrevocable
liability is incurred or title passes within the United States); Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt. Ltd.
v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 645 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that
transfer of title of foreign securities with the United States may fall within the reach of
10(b)).
148. 677 F.3d 60 (2nd Cir. 2012).
149. Id. at 68.
150. 902 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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or title was transferred within the United States” sufficiently to
survive a motion to dismiss.151 Several months earlier, the same judge
dismissed the claim in Pope Investments II, L.L.C. v. Deheng Law
Firm,152 finding plaintiffs’ allegations that they “drafted the Securities
Purchase Agreement, presumably in China” without “alleg[ing]
where that agreement was negotiated or signed” were insufficient to
avoid dismissal.153 Similarly, in MVP Asset Management (USA) L.L.C.
v. Vestbirk,154 the court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims “that certain funds
were transferred in between New York-based banking institutions,”
finding them “insufficient to establish the existence of a domestic
transaction.”155 The state of the law is, therefore, presently unsettled.
Nonetheless, the trend of the case law is that defendants have
arguments under procedural and substantive law to short-circuit the
choice of a U.S. forum.
In light of the current interpretations of the Morrison decision by
federal courts and in light of heightened pleading standards required
under federal procedural law, plaintiffs face substantial obstacles to
filing transnational securities fraud claims in federal courts, but may
face fewer obstacles in other fora, which are discussed below.
State Law. Besides trying to plead around Morrison’s precise
holding in federal court under federal law, other plaintiffs have filed
cases under U.S. state securities laws in federal courts or in U.S. state
courts.
Two New York state court decisions highlight the trend. In Basis
Yield Alpha Fund v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,156 a New York
Supreme Court justice refused to dismiss a fraud claim brought
against Goldman Sachs by an Australian hedge fund.157 The case was
originally filed in federal district court the same month the Supreme
Court decided Morrison.158 The federal court dismissed the suit
following the Morrison decision, and plaintiffs filed a parallel case in
state court alleging state law claims.159 The state law claims included a
151. Id. at 473 (quoting Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d
60, 68 (2d Cir. 2012)).
152. No. 10 Civ. 6608(LLS), 2012 WL 3526621 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2012).
153. Id. at *6–7.
154. MVP Asset Mgmt. v. Vestbirk, No. 2:10-cv-02483-GEB-CKD, 2012 WL 2873371
(E.D. Cal. July 12, 2012).
155. Id. at *7.
156. No. 652996/2011, 961 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 2012).
157. Id. at *10.
158. Id. at *4.
159. Id. (acknowledging that the S.D.N.Y dismissed the same case “on the ground that
the underlying transactions were not domestic securities transactions, and, therefore, not
subject to federal securities laws”).
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variety of common law claims, and while the court granted
defendants’ motion to dismiss on some of those claims, it denied the
motion with respect to most of plaintiffs’ claims.160
In Viking Global Equities, L.P. v. Porsche Automobil Holding
SE,161 plaintiff hedge funds allegedly sustained losses as a result of
misrepresentations made by Porsche relating to its intention to
acquire shares in Volkswagen AG.162 Although plaintiffs initially
survived a motion for summary judgment, the victory was short-lived.
In December 2012, only a month after argument on Porsche’s appeal,
the First Department of New York’s Appellate Division reversed the
trial court, holding—in an opinion only two paragraphs long—that
the plaintiffs were barred on the ground of forum non conveniens.163
These two cases illustrate that plaintiffs continue to face
substantial obstacles even when pleading state law claims. This will
encourage plaintiffs to search for other favorable law and fora to
bring cases.
Foreign Law and Courts. To date, plaintiffs have had limited
success under federal and state law. One might expect plaintiffs to
plead foreign law in federal and state courts. Such cases would,
however, be a prime candidates for forum non conveniens
dismissal.164 In light of the likelihood of dismissal, it is not surprising
that plaintiffs have sought foreign courts to plead foreign law, and
they have begun to see some success. In short, a transnational law
market has developed where foreign courts compete through their
laws for transnational securities claims.
At present, Canada and the Netherlands present favorable laws
and fora for litigating transnational securities cases. Canada presents
a compelling forum because it has recently enacted laws that are

160. Id. at *10.
161. 101 A.D.3d 640 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
162. Id. at 641.
163. Id. at 640–41.
164. Forum non conveniens dismissals are most likely when a foreign plaintiff brings a
case in a U.S. court and pleads foreign law. See Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes
International, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1531, 1562 (2011) (analyzing the doctrine’s increased
usage and impact). Other difficulties with pleading foreign law in U.S. courts would be the
fact that foreign public laws are generally not enforceable in the United States and
problems with the superiority element of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Linda J. Silberman, Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Implications for Global
Securities Class Actions 11–14 (N.Y.U. Sch. of L., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-41, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers cfm?abstract_id=1864786.
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similar to section 10(b).165 In addition, in 2011, the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice declined to adopt a Morrison-like rule on global
claims in Abdula v. Canadian Solar, Inc.166 Canada has also handled a
global class action in Silver v. IMAX, Corp.167 In light of these recent
cases, it is not surprising that since the Morrison decision, securities
class action suits in Canada have been on the rise.168
Between 2008 and 2010, twenty-seven new securities class actions
were filed in Canada.169 In 2011, fifteen new security class actions
were filed.170 In total, forty-five securities class actions are active in
Canada, totaling $24.5 billion in claims.171 Of those claims, six are
cross-border cases.172 With this jump, it appears that many of the
claims previously brought in the United States have made their way
across the northern border. Filings should be expected to increase in
Canadian court because:
(1) the impact of Morrison on claims in U.S. courts for non-U.S.
investors in non-U.S. stocks (which makes Canada a more
attractive venue for these cases), (2) the growth in the Canadian
class action bar in terms of both firms and lawyers bringing and
defending the cases, (3) Canadian rulings granting certification
of global classes and giving plaintiffs leave to proceed, and (4)
the success of class counsel in reaching multi-million dollar
settlements in Canada (and class-counsel fee awards).173
The Netherlands has also recently opened its doors to
transnational litigation. For example, in 2005, the Netherlands
enacted the Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade (“Collective
Settlement of Mass Damages Act,” or “WCAM”), a statute that
allows Dutch courts to settle—but not litigate—transnational disputes

165. See Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5 (Can.), available at http://www.elaws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90s05_e.htm.
166. 2011 ONSC 5105 para. 45 (Can.).
167. 2009 CanLII 72334 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
168. Ashby Jones, Lawyers Looking to Canada for Shareholder Litigation, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 27, 2012, at B4.
169. John E. Black, Jr. & Ellen D. Jenkins, D & O Litigation Trends in 2010, IRMI (Mar.
2011), http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2011/black03-directors-officers-insurance.aspx.
170. Bradley A. Heys & Mark L. Berenblut, Trends in Canadian Securities Class
Actions: 2011 Update, NERA 1 (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/
publications/archive2/PUB_Recent_Trends_Canada_2011_0412.pdf.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 6.
173. Kaal & Painter, supra note 27, at 188.
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on a class-wide, opt-out basis.174 The WCAM is open not only to
Dutch citizens, but also to citizens of other countries.175 In 2010, two
months after Morrison, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals declared
“an international collective settlement binding in a case where none
of the potentially liable parties and only some of the potential
claimants are domiciled in the Netherlands.”176 The potential for
forum shopping to the Netherlands is obvious: such suits could
involve plaintiffs whose securities transactions occurred both within
and outside the United States. Because the Netherlands allows for
class actions in limited circumstances and because its substantive law
recognizes a variation of the fraud-on-the-market theory,177 suing in
the Netherlands might be highly attractive.178
In sum, contracting federal law has encouraged plaintiffs to seek
state and foreign law and, in some cases, foreign courts, to bring their
cases. In light of the foregoing, there is every reason to believe that
this trend will continue in the years to come. As such, it will create the
possibility of not only regulatory competition between fora but also
regulatory overlap as various legal regimes are asked to adjudicate
transnational cases. Transnational securities cases are but one
example of this trend. The next subpart explores the possibility of
increased regulatory competition in other areas of law.
B.

The Presumption’s Impact on U.S. Federal Law

Cases filed in U.S. courts under the federal securities laws are
not the only transnational cases impacted by the Morrison decision.
Courts have also used the extraterritoriality rationale of Morrison in
analyzing federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

174. See Deborah R. Hensler, Keynote, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class
Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 310–14 (2011)
(discussing the 2005 Dutch Act).
175. See Madeleine Giansanti et al., Europe, 44 INT’L LAW. 645, 652 (2010) (noting
that two recent settlements in Dutch courts “demonstrate that WCAM has truly global
potential to settle class claims, at least against Dutch defendants”).
176. Interim Ruling by Amsterdam Court of Appeal on International Jurisdiction in
Collective Settlement Cases, NAUTADUTILH (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.newsletternautadutilh.com/EN/xzine/class_actions/interim_ruling_by_amsterdam_court_of_appeal_o
n_international_jurisdiction_in_collective_settlement_cases.html?cid=4&xzine_id=4488.
177. See Shelley Thompson, The Globalization of Securities Markets: Effects on
Investor Protection, 41 INT’L LAW. 1121, 1139–41 (2007) (comparing U.S. and Dutch
securities laws).
178. Other fora also present viable alternatives. See generally Samuel Issacharoff &
Thad Eagles, The Australian Alternative: A View from Abroad of Recent Developments in
Securities Class Actions, 38 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 1 (2015) (discussing Australia’s
favorable class action regime for securities cases in particular).
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Act (“RICO”) cases.179 Following Morrison, the Second Circuit has
held that because “RICO is silent as to any extraterritorial
application,” it does not have any “extraterritorial reach.”180 Courts
have taken two principal approaches to determining whether an
alleged RICO violation is domestic or foreign. The majority of courts
to address the issue look at the location of the alleged RICO
enterprise itself, as opposed to the location of the predicate acts of
racketeering. For instance, Judge Rakoff explained the rationale for
this approach in Cedeño v. Intech Group, Inc.181:
RICO is not a recidivist statute designed to punish someone for
committing a pattern of multiple criminal acts. Rather, it
prohibits the use of such a pattern to impact an
enterprise . . . . Thus, the focus of RICO is on the enterprise as
the recipient of, or cover for, a pattern of criminal activity.182
Courts that have looked at the location of the alleged RICO
enterprise have generally applied a “nerve center” test. Under this
test, an alleged RICO violation is deemed to occur at “the place
where overall corporate policy originates or the nerve center from
which it radiates out to its constituent parts and from which its
officers direct, control and coordinate all activities without regard to
locale, in the furtherance of the corporate objectives.”183 In analyzing
the territoriality of an enterprise in a RICO complaint, the court
should focus on that enterprise’s decisions that effectuate the
relationships and common interests of its members.184 A minority of
courts that have analyzed the application of Morrison to RICO have

179. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012).
180. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 32–33 (2d Cir. 2010)
(quoting North South Finance Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996)).
181. 733 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Cedeño v. Castillo, No. 103861, 2012 WL 205960 (2d Cir. Jan. 25, 2012).
182. Id. at 473–74. For similar cases on point, see Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. v. Alcoa
Inc., No. 08-299, 2012 WL 2093997, at *2–4 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2012); Mitsui O.S.K. Lines,
Ltd. v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 933, 939 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Sorota v.
Sosa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2012); In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., No. 9-1445, 2011
WL 2112533, at *2–3 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011); In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d
883, 914 (C.D. Cal. 2011); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28–
29 (D.D.C. 2011); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-5771, 2011 WL 843957, at
*4–6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011), vacated, 764 F.3d 129, 130 (2d Cir. 2014).
183. Royal Indem. Co. v. Wyckoff Heights Hosp., 953 F. Supp. 460, 462–63 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) (citations omitted).
184. Id.
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looked at the location of the predicate acts of racketeering in addition
to the location of the alleged RICO enterprise.185
One recent decision adopts a different approach. In European
Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,186 the Second Circuit held that
“RICO applies extraterritorially if, and only if, liability or guilt could
attach to extraterritorial conduct under the relevant RICO
predicate.”187 The court went on to hold that when the predicate
statute itself manifests an “unmistakable congressional intent to apply
extraterritorially, RICO will apply to extraterritorial conduct, too, but
only to the extent that the predicate would.”188 In light of these
diverging opinions, there is reason to believe that the Supreme Court
will have to resolve the split in the near future.
Another area of law impacted by Morrison is fraud actions under
the Commodities Exchange Act (“CEA”).189 While the CEA
resembles federal securities law, it does not have the same language
of section 10(b) that limits claims to the “purchase or sale of a
security.”190 However, two courts have found that the logic of
Morrison extends to actions brought under the CEA and have
required the plaintiff’s claims to allege facts that would satisfy the
application of the CEA under Morrison and Absolute Activist’s
irrevocable liability test.191 In both cases, the plaintiffs failed to plead
sufficient facts to show that they incurred irrevocable liability within
the United States.192 These cases show the extent that Morrison’s test
and the development of case law applying Morrison’s principles can
affect other areas that are similar to the federal securities laws
originally at issue.
Morrison has also impacted the antiretaliation provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act. In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.,193 Asadi, a
duel U.S. and Iraqi citizen, was a U.S.-based employee for G.E.
Energy but was temporarily relocated to Jordan.194 Asadi claimed he
learned that G.E. Energy was engaged in corrupt actions during a
185. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229, 242 n.50, 245 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (holding that while the location of the RICO enterprise may be relevant, a court
should also look at where the pattern of racketeering is alleged to have occurred).
186. 764 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2014).
187. Id. at 136.
188. Id.
189. 7 U.S.C. § 60 (2012).
190. Id.
191. See Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 936 F. Supp. 2d 357, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2013);
Starshinova v. Batratchenko, 931 F. Supp. 2d 478, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
192. Loginovskaya, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 375; Starshinova, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 487.
193. No. 4:12-345, 2012 WL 2522599 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2012).
194. Id. at *1.
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negotiation for a lucrative Joint Venture Agreement with the Iraqi
government.195 The alleged corruption involved the hiring of a woman
“closely associated” with an Iraqi official.196 After learning of the
hiring, Asadi reported the potential corruption to his superiors. He
was later fired and brought suit.197 In analyzing his claim, the court
found that Dodd-Frank was silent as to the extraterritorial application
of the whistleblower provisions.198 Asadi argued that he was a U.S.
employee and that the termination invoked U.S. at-will employment
law, but the court held that the termination was in Jordan, relating to
employment in Jordan, and the statute’s language was insufficient to
bring the conduct within the Anti-Retaliation Provision of DoddFrank.199 Other cases have followed this reasoning.200 Thus, even if an
employee is under a U.S. employment contract, if his whistleblower
actions occur abroad, he may find it difficult to apply the protections
of Dodd-Frank after Morrison.
The Morrison reasoning could also have an impact in antitrust,
employment, and environmental cases.201 In light of the limited ability
for plaintiffs to plead transnational cases under federal law, it is likely
that plaintiffs will seek other fora in U.S. state and foreign courts.
The next subpart focuses on the Supreme Court’s recently issued
opinion in Kiobel and explores how the transnational law market may
respond to it.
C.

Current and Evolving Impact: The Alien Tort Statute

The effect of Morrison’s revival of the presumption against
extraterritoriality is evidenced by the Supreme Court’s recent opinion
in Kiobel.202 In that case, the court addressed whether the ATS
provided a cause of action for violations of the law of nations that
occur in a foreign country.203 The plaintiffs, residents of Ogoniland,
Nigeria, brought suit against Shell Petroleum Development Company
of Nigeria (“SPDC”), incorporated in Nigeria, and its parents: Royal
Dutch Petroleum Company, incorporated in the Netherlands, and
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at *4.
199. Id. at *5.
200. See, e.g., Liu v. Siemens A.G., 978 F. Supp. 2d 325, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
201. Stephen R. Smerek & Jason C. Hamilton, Extraterritorial Application of United
States Law after Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 5 NO. 1 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 21, 30–
33 (2011).
202. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662–63 (2013).
203. Id. at 1662.
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Shell Transport and Trading Company, incorporated in England.204
The complaint alleged that SPDC utilized the Nigerian government to
“violently suppress” environmental protests by the town.205 The
Nigerian military and police forces allegedly attacked villages in the
area “beating, raping, killing, and arresting residents and destroying
or looting property.”206 The complaint also alleged that SPDC “aided
and abetted” the Nigerian government by allowing the military to use
SPDC property as a staging ground for these attacks, as well as
providing food, transportation, and compensation to the military.207
The plaintiffs were granted political asylum by the United States
where they are now legal residents.208 They brought suit against SPDC
alleging numerous law of nations violations stemming from the
attacks in Ogoniland.209
When the Supreme Court initially took the case, the Court was
asked to decide whether corporations were subject to suit under the
ATS.210 However, after oral argument, the Court took the atypical
step of setting the case for re-argument and requested additional
briefing on the question of whether the ATS could be applied
extraterritorially.211 After this second round of briefing and argument,
the Court held that the presumption against extraterritoriality applied
to the ATS.212 According to the Court, “all the relevant conduct took
place outside the United States,” and the presumption could not be
rebutted.213 Even if the ATS claims “touch and concern” conduct
within the United States, that conduct “must do so with sufficient
force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application.”214 The fact that a corporation is present in the country
would not be sufficient.215 Thus, the Court has substantially limited
the ATS’s application to most transnational tort claims, allowing it
only where this “sufficient force” exists.216 Indeed, since the Kiobel
decision, most federal courts adjudicating cases have dismissed ATS
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1662–63.
208. Id. at 1663.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Lyle Denniston, Kiobel to Be Expanded and Reargued, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 5,
2012, 2:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/kiobel-to-be-reargued/.
212. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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claims because the plaintiffs had not plausibly pled allegations
involving significant unlawful activity in the United States.217
In light of Kiobel’s holding, plaintiffs might seek out U.S. state
law—in federal and state courts—and foreign law—in foreign
courts—to plead transnational tort claims. In fact, many plaintiffs had
already included state law claims in ATS litigation prior to Kiobel.218
These claims appear in the form of the torts of wrongful death,
battery, and assault—contrasted with their ATS counterparts of
summary execution and torture.219
Two cases are of note in predicting what future transnational tort
litigation may look like in state court. In Doe v. Unocal Corp.,220
plaintiffs refiled the pendent state claims arising from a pipeline
project in Burma that were dismissed following the ATS dismissal in
district court.221 The case went through discovery in state court and
eventually settled prior to trial.222 In Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,223 the
D.C. Circuit ruled that the ATS claims could proceed to trial along
with the state law tort claims.224 After sua sponte staying proceedings
while the Supreme Court considered Kiobel, it subsequently vacated
its order as to the ATS claims and remanded the case to the district
court for consideration of the ATS claims in light of Kiobel.225 In so
doing, it expressly preserved the parts of its prior opinion that
permitted the state law tort claims to proceed.226 In those parts of the

217. See, e.g., Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 591–92 (9th Cir. 2014); Cardona v.
Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189–91 (11th Cir. 2014); Balintulo v. Daimler
AG, 727 F.3d 174, 191–92 (2d Cir. 2013).
218. Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International Human Rights Cases Under State
Law and in State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9, 15 (2013).
219. Id.
220. 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) [hereinafter Unocal I], aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
221. Id. at 883–84, 892 (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss); Doe v. Unocal Corp.,
110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1312 (C.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter Unocal II] (granting defendants’
motion for summary judgment), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 395 F.3d 932, 962–63 (9th Cir.
2002) (consolidating Unocal’s motions in Unocal I and Unocal II, reversing summary
judgment and remanding for trial).
222. See Unocal Settles Rights Suit in Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at C6. For
further explanation of the procedural history of both the federal and state actions, see also
Doe v. Unocal Case History, EARTHRIGHTS INT’L, http://www.earthrights.org/legal/doe-vunocal-case-history (last visited Feb. 24, 2015).
223. 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (mem.).
224. Id. at 69–70, 71.
225. See generally Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (mem.)
(vacating and remanding in light of Kiobel).
226. Rich Samp, Post-‘Kiobel’ Human Rights Suits vs. Corporations: A New Reliance on
Common Law?, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2013, 9:08 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/
2013/08/19/post-kiobel-human-rights-suits-vs-corporations-a-new-reliance-on-common-law/.
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opinion, the court determined under choice of law rules that the law
of Indonesia would apply.227 The case is presently pending before the
D.C. federal district court.228 These cases illustrate how plaintiffs may
find their way into U.S. courts using state tort law as opposed to ATS
causes of action.229
Notwithstanding Kiobel, it is possible for plaintiffs to plead state
law claims in federal court under diversity230 or supplemental
jurisdiction.231 A plaintiff would also be able to plead foreign law
under these same doctrines.
Plaintiffs might, however, prefer to bring suit under foreign law
in foreign courts. As mentioned in the Introduction, a recent
transnational tort case filed against a Dutch corporation for torts
allegedly committed in Nigeria just reached a favorable judgment in
the Netherlands. On January 30, 2013, a Nigerian subsidiary of Shell
was held liable for damages in Nigeria based on Nigerian tort law.232
At least two other countries, the United Kingdom and Canada, also
present viable fora for such cases in the years to come.
Recently, courts in the United Kingdom have resolved numerous
ATS-like disputes. The results of these cases vary. One case in
particular has reportedly settled, in part, for perhaps as much as $400
million.233 Other cases have settled for many millions of dollars,
including one case for $48 million.234 According to one keen observer
of these trends, “the rate of settlement in the U.K. court is []
impressive” because “80% (four out of five) of its U.K. business
human rights disputes litigated to a full conclusion [in the United
Kingdom] have resulted in a payout. The comparable figure for U.S.
corporate alien tort suits is 9.5%.”235
The continuing impact of the Kiobel decision on the filing of
transnational tort cases in the United States and elsewhere will take
time to evaluate, depending on how plaintiffs and courts respond to
the Court’s Kiobel decision.
227. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 70.
228. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 1:11-CV-0912, 2014 WL 4745256 (D.D.C. Sept. 23,
2014).
229. For a more complete review of state law claims in human rights litigation, see
generally Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 218.
230. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
231. See id. at § 1367.
232. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
233. Sylvia Pfeifer & Jane Croft, Shell’s Nigeria Pay-Out Could Top 250m, FIN. TIMES
(Aug. 3, 2011, 7:21 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4209f536-bde8-11e0-ab9f-00144
feabdc0.html#axzz3Pf1hpUjN.
234. Goldhaber, supra note 32, at 131.
235. Id.
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As explained above, recent Supreme Court decisions restricting
the extraterritorial application of U.S. federal law in the securities
and ATS contexts have encouraged plaintiffs to file transnational
cases under state and foreign law and, in some cases, in state and
foreign fora. These cases show the impact that limiting the
extraterritorial application of U.S. federal law can have on litigant
choice. In the next Part, this Article examines other areas that point
to a restrictive ethos in federal procedural and substantive law. These
developments will also encourage litigants to seek other law and
other fora to file transnational cases.
III. RESTRICTING TRANSNATIONAL CASES
The transnational law market described above is not simply the
reaction to one or two Supreme Court decisions regarding the
extraterritorial application of U.S. federal law. Rather, there is a
significant movement generally in U.S. law towards restricting federal
law and federal courts that will impact transnational litigation.236 In
this Part, the Article takes a more systemic approach and analyzes the
array of procedural devices, such as personal jurisdiction, pleading
doctrine, class actions, and doctrines of discretion, utilized by U.S.
federal courts to limit transnational cases. To the extent that these
decisions constrict the ability of plaintiffs to avail themselves of U.S.
federal fora in transnational cases, there will be an opportunity for
other fora to compete to adjudicate and regulate transnational harms,
which will be discussed in Part IV.
A. Restricting Personal Jurisdiction
As already noted, one of the key reasons why transnational
plaintiffs are drawn to the United States is the belief that a liberal
personal jurisdiction doctrine affords them the opportunity to bring
suit here.237 The Supreme Court, however, has made it much more
difficult to file transnational cases in U.S. courts when the defendant
does not cause a harm or is not personally served within the forum
state’s borders.
In January 2014, the Court handed down its decision in Daimler
AG v. Bauman.238 In that case, the Court was asked to decide whether
236. One scholar has termed this trend as “litigation isolationism,” and has counseled
against its expansion. See generally Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2546351.
237. See Whytock, supra note 10, at 484.
238. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
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Daimler, a German corporation, could be sued based on general
jurisdiction in California for alleged harms committed by one of its
subsidiaries in Argentina during that country’s “Dirty War.”239 While
the plaintiffs conceded that Daimler did not have the requisite
contacts with California itself to sustain general jurisdiction, they
creatively argued that another of Daimler’s subsidiaries, MercedezBenz USA, could have its contacts with California attributed to
Daimler to establish general jurisdiction.240 Surprisingly, the Court did
not reach the question of attribution but took the opportunity to
restate its view established in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown241 that general jurisdiction is only appropriate in a
corporate defendant’s state of incorporation, principal place of
business, or in an exceptional case in some other forum where the
defendant is “essentially at home.”242
In Goodyear, two North Carolina residents were killed in a bus
accident in Paris, France, due to an allegedly defective tire
manufactured in Turkey by a foreign subsidiary of Goodyear.243
Plaintiffs argued that the North Carolina state court had general
jurisdiction over the foreign defendants because the defendants sold
their product in the United States, including in North Carolina where
tens of thousands of tires were sent to the forum state between 2004
and 2007.244 The Supreme Court reversed the court below, holding in
a unanimous opinion that a corporation is only subject to suit in its
principal place of business, state of incorporation, or another place
where the corporation is “essentially at home in the forum state.”245
In another case argued and decided the same day, J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,246 a New Jersey plaintiff was injured by a
metal-shearing machine while working in New Jersey.247 The machine
was manufactured in England, where the defendant was incorporated,
and distributed in the United States through the English
manufacturer’s independent Ohio distributor.248 Plaintiffs argued that
the New Jersey state court had specific jurisdiction because the
product was purposefully directed at the U.S. market and caused an
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See id. at 748.
See id. at 751.
131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011).
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 761.
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850.
Id. at 2852.
Id.
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
Id. at 2786.
Id. at 2786, 2796.
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injury in New Jersey.249 Here again, the Court reversed the lower
court, holding in a plurality opinion that the defendant must
purposefully target a specific U.S. state to be subject to the forum’s
jurisdiction.250 Because the manufacturer sold the machine through a
U.S. distributer that sold throughout the United States and did not
specifically target the forum state, jurisdiction was found wanting.251
In these cases, the Court constricted the ability of plaintiffs to
bring transnational cases as a matter of personal jurisdiction in the
United States. In short, it will be much harder in years to come for
foreign defendants in transnational cases to be sued in the United
States, both in federal and state courts. Especially with regard to
foreign corporations, plaintiffs will need to find a forum in the United
States where there are substantial business contacts, such as in New
York for most companies, given stocks and corporate presence.
However, such an approach to personal jurisdiction, known as “doing
business” jurisdiction, is presently unsettled.252 In the alternative,
plaintiffs will have to bring suit against U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
corporations and argue that the jurisdictional contacts of the
subsidiary should be attributed to the parent.253 This area is equally
unsettled.254
Even in these cases, as discussed below, the forum non
conveniens doctrine may continue to limit the availability of a U.S.
forum. It appears, therefore, that transnational cases will be subject to
personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts only in cases where the foreign
defendant is “essentially at home” there or where the defendant
purposefully targets the precise forum where the harm occurs, which
means that the case involves a transnational defendant that has
caused harm in a particular U.S. forum. The likelihood of filing a
Kiobel or Morrison case—cases where there are foreign plaintiffs and
foreign defendants being sued for foreign harms—is substantially
limited in light of this recent case law. As discussed in the next
subpart, other recent developments in federal procedural law also
limit these types of cases.
249. Id. at 2790.
250. Id. at 2790–91.
251. Id.
252. See generally Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing
Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671 (2012) (explaining doing business jurisdiction
and pointing to its viability in light of recent Supreme Court cases).
253. See, e.g., Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 920 (9th Cir. 2011),
rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
254. See Donald Earl Childress III, General Jurisdiction After Bauman, 66 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 203, 204–05 (2014).
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Restricting Pleading Doctrine

Recall that one reason why plaintiffs would bring suit in the
United States is the belief that liberal discovery will help the plaintiff
develop his case or perhaps encourage a settlement. Federal courts
are also constricting access to discovery because a plaintiff is only
entitled to discovery if she can survive a motion to dismiss. However,
heightened pleading standards will limit the general availability of
discovery in many transnational cases.
Through two recent cases, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly255 and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,256 the Court has instituted a plausibility pleading
standard for cases filed in federal court. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure states that “a pleading must contain a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.”257 After Twombly and Iqbal, the “short and plain
statement” standard became harder to meet. Now, in general, a
plaintiff must plead sufficient facts, accepted as true, and state a claim
that is “plausible on its face.”258 In order for that claim to be plausible,
the facts must be sufficient for the court to draw reasonable
inferences that the defendant is liable for the alleged conduct.259
Furthermore, those facts need to show more than a “sheer possibility”
that the defendant is liable and the facts cannot be “merely consistent
with a defendant’s liability.”260 Thus, plaintiffs must pass a higher bar
in the pleading stage, “nudg[ing their] claims . . . across the line from
conceivable to plausible.”261
Lest there be any doubt, courts are requiring heightened
pleading standards in transnational cases. After Morrison and Kiobel,
for instance, courts struggled to determine what facts plaintiffs
needed to plead in order to determine if the defendant’s conduct was
extraterritorial. In the securities context, the leading case is Absolute
Activist Value Master Fund v. Ficeto.262 The Second Circuit
determined that Morrison required claims to fall within two
categories to be domestic transaction subject to federal securities
laws.263 First, transactions involving securities traded on domestic

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

550 U.S. 544 (2007).
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
556 U.S. at 678.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 680 (internal quotation marks omitted).
677 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 66.
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exchanges would suffice.264 The second prong required the transaction
itself to be domestic.265 For a transaction to be domestic and outside
of Morrison’s extraterritoriality analysis, the complaint must allege
that “irrevocable liability was incurred or that title was transferred
within the United States,”266 that is, “when the parties become bound
to effectuate the transaction.”267
Several courts have adopted this approach to cases postMorrison.268 Thus in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the pleading
must “allege facts leading to the plausible inference of a domestic
transaction.”269 This approach brings its own difficulties for plaintiffs.
In a world of transnational business, plaintiffs alleging fraud must
spend the resources to find sufficient facts to plead that the
transaction was domestic under the “irrevocable liability” test.
The same pleading difficulties can be seen in the ATS context as
well. In In re South African Apartheid Litigation,270 the court found it
was possible for the plaintiffs to plead a private act of apartheid with
the “requisite degree of specificity.”271 However, such a claim was not
widely recognized, and the court refused to allow it.272 The difficulty
in pleading with specificity is that ATS litigation requires the tort be
recognized as a violation of the law of nations.273
Therefore, plaintiffs face two difficulties in pleading ATS claims.
First, plaintiffs must develop a theory (and elements) to sustain a
cause of action under a tort in violation of the law of nations, and they
must also do so with sufficient particularity. Second, plaintiffs must
plead “that the actions of [the foreign defendants] touch and concern
the United States with sufficient force to rebut the presumption

264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 62.
267. Id. at 67.
268. See SEC v. Chicago Convention Ctr., 961 F. Supp. 2d 905, 917 (N.D. Ill. 2013)
(“The Second Circuit has provided guidance on what constitutes a domestic purchase or
sale for purposes of the Morrison transactional test.”); MVP Asset Mgmt. (USA) LLC v.
Vestbirk, No. 2:10-cv-02483-GEB-CKD, 2013 WL 1726359, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2013)
(utilizing the Second Circuit’s test to determine if the transaction was domestic). But see
Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt. Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 645 F.3d 1307,
1310–11 (11th Cir. 2011) (determining that the second prong would only be satisfied if the
transaction occurred within the territorial reach of the United States).
269. Arco Capital Corp. v. Deutsche Bank AG, 949 F. Supp. 2d 532, 541 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
270. 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
271. Id. at 251.
272. Id. at 252.
273. See id. at 257.
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against the extraterritorial reach of the ATS.”274 In compliance with
Iqbal and Twombly, the facts they plead must also be plausible and
not mere conclusions or assertions. This difficulty may cause ATS
plaintiffs to forum shop away from U.S. federal courts in search of
fora where pleadings need not comport with such stringent standards.
Alternative courts include state and foreign courts.
As such, plaintiffs will not only face significant hurdles in
pleading their claims, but also may not have the benefit of discovery
in hopes of ferreting out wrongdoing.275 Similarly, defendants will
have increased bargaining position when it comes to settlement
decisions in light of the fact that discovery, and the costs associated
with it, might be avoided.
C.

Restricting Class Actions

The possibility of aggregate litigation is another reason why
transnational plaintiffs would seek out U.S. courts. Class actions are,
however, being restricted in the United States. To begin with,
Congress has limited the reach of class actions through the Class
Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”),276 which amended the federal
diversity statute to allow parties to move class actions out of state
court and into federal court.277 While the reasons for passing this
statute were many, a significant reason was the belief that sending
state class actions to federal judges makes class certification less
likely.278
Even putting aside CAFA, class action certification is
increasingly subject to heightened standards in light of the Court’s
recent decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.279 In Dukes, the court reviewed
the class certification of a case against Wal-Mart, the nation’s largest
private employer, brought by more than one and a half million female
employees who alleged gender discrimination under Title VII over
pay and promotions.280 The plaintiffs alleged the discrimination was

274. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., Nos. 02 MDL 1499, 02 Civ. 4712, Civ. 6218, Civ.
1024, 03 Civ. 4524, 2013 WL 6813877, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2013).
275. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (“[Rule 8] does not unlock the
doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”). A plaintiff
must have sufficient facts to allege the wrongdoing in order to reach discovery where the
proof of such facts can be found. The simple conclusion will no longer suffice.
276. 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2012).
277. Id.
278. See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement
Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1912–13 (2006).
279. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
280. Id. at 2547.
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common to all Wal-Mart female employees, based on a “corporate
culture” that allowed bias against women.281 The Court took the case
to review whether the class complied with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a) and its four requirements: numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequate representation.282
The case turned on the commonality requirement—whether the
plaintiffs showed that “there are questions of law or fact common to
the class.”283 Commonality requires that every class member
“suffer[ed] the same injury,” beyond merely a violation under the
same law.284 The requirement means that the claims “must depend
upon a common contention,” such as bias by the same supervisor.285
Furthermore, that common contention must be capable of class-wide
resolution—the contention’s resolution will resolve an issue central to
every individual claim “in one stroke.”286 A class-action plaintiff
cannot merely plead a case meeting the Rule 23 requirements.287 The
Court requires that the plaintiff must prove that the requirements are
met “in fact.”288
Here, the Court determined the record showed only one
common policy—local supervisor discretion over employment
matters, which would establish a discriminatory environment.289
However, the Court concluded that a local discretionary policy
worked against the plaintiff’s contention that there was a common
employment practice, which the plaintiffs needed to meet the
commonality requirement.290 Furthermore, even recognizing that such
claims “can exist does not lead to the conclusion that every employee
in a company using a system of discretion has such a claim in
common.”291 The Court found that there was “no convincing proof”
of a company-wide discriminatory policy.292 Because the plaintiffs
could not show that the class certification would lead to a common

281. Id. at 2548.
282. Id. at 2550.
283. Id. at 2550–51.
284. Id. at 2551 (quoting Gen. Telephone Co. of S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157
(1982)).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 2554.
290. Id.
291. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
292. Id. at 2556–57.
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question on such a policy, the Court reversed the certification of the
class.293
Dukes restricted the use of the class-action vehicle unless the
plaintiff class can meet this rigorous requirement. The class cannot
merely plead that the Rule 23 requirements are met, but must also
show they are met with “convincing proof” if they are to survive as a
class.294 Because of these requirements, it is likely that transnational
plaintiffs will face heightened procedural bars to filing their cases as
class actions in the United States. Other more flexible procedural
doctrines also present themselves as obstacles for transnational
plaintiffs and are discussed in the next subsection.
D. Restrictive Doctrines of Discretion
Courts might also use other doctrines to limit transactional cases.
There has been a significant increase in forum non conveniens
decisions in federal courts in recent years. Between 1990 and 2006,
there were roughly 691 (about 43 per year) reported transnational
forum non conveniens decisions by federal courts.295 Overall, the
courts dismissed in favor of a foreign forum in about 50% of these
cases.296 In cases involving a foreign plaintiff, the dismissal rate was
higher, at 63%.297 Foreign plaintiffs are “twice as likely to have their
suits dismissed” compared to domestic plaintiffs.298
Forum non conveniens motions may increase in future years in
light of recent Supreme Court precedent encouraging the doctrine’s
293. Id. at 2561.
294. See Kassman v. KPMG LLP, 925 F. Supp. 2d 453, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(determining that a Dukes argument was premature at the motion to dismiss or strike
stage because the relevant inquiry is whether it was plausible); see also Calibuso v. Bank of
Am. Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 374, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[I]t is plausible that plaintiffs will
come forth with sufficient evidence at the class certification stage to demonstrate
commonality.”); Barghout v. Bayer Healthcare Pharms., No. 11-cv-15761, 2012 WL
1113973, at *10, *12 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2012) (finding that a motion to dismiss should be
denied where plaintiffs had plausibly alleged a disparate impact claim based on companywide promotion and pay policies).
295. Christopher A. Whytock, Politics and the Rule of Law in Transnational Judicial
Governance: The Case of Forum Non Conveniens 15 (Feb. 28, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969033.
296. Id. at 16.
297. Whytock, supra note 10, at 503. This is likely accounted for by the fact that in
conducting the forum non conveniens analysis, a court may give less deference to a foreign
plaintiff’s choice of forum under Supreme Court case law. See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235, 255–56 (1981) (“When the home forum [is] chosen, it is reasonable to assume
that this choice is convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign . . . this assumption is . . . less
reasonable. Because the central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure
that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff’s choice deserves less deference.”).
298. Whytock, supra note 10, at 503–04.
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use.299 Besides increased invocation of forum non conveniens, many
federal district courts have applied other doctrines like international
comity, the political question doctrine, and exhaustion that might
limit the ability of transnational cases to go forward.300 Taken
together, it is likely that courts may use these doctrines to restrict
transnational cases.
The closing of federal courthouse doors brought about through
federal extraterritoriality decisions as well as other federal procedural
movements potentially creates opportunities for other fora to
prescribe and adjudicate transnational harms. This outcome has the
potential to move litigants away from federal law in federal courts
and towards other law—state and foreign—in other fora—including
state and foreign. We may thus see a brave new world of
transnational litigation where litigation occurs (1) in federal courts
under state and foreign law, (2) in U.S. state courts under state and
foreign law, and (3) in foreign courts under foreign law. In the next
Part, the Article explains how courts should account for the
transnational law market.
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW MARKET
While it may be too early to take full account of the substantive
and procedural trends that compromise a foreign plaintiff’s ability to
file a transnational case in U.S. federal courts, one can examine
prospectively the impact that this movement of restricting federal
court access will have on transnational litigation beyond federal
courts and law. Such an examination is timely and important. It is
timely given the Supreme Court’s recent Morrison decision, which
has impacted a wide swath of federal statutes, and the decision in
Kiobel, which has the potential to change the way transnational
human rights litigation is conducted in the United States. It is
299. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay Int’l. Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 436 (2007).
300. See, e.g., Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1032 (W.D. Wash. 2005)
(“This case must also be dismissed because it interferes with the foreign policy of the
United States of America . . . . For this court to preclude sales of Caterpillar products to
Israel would be to make a foreign policy decision and to impinge directly upon the
prerogatives of the executive branch of government.”); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1194 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“[T]he State Department has filed a
Statement of Interest outlining several areas of foreign policy that would be negatively
impacted by proceeding with the instant case . . . . [P]roceeding with the litigation would
indicate a ‘lack of respect’ for the Executive’s preferred approach of handling the Santo
Domingo bombing and relations with Colombia in general.”); In re Nazi Era Cases
Against Ger. Defendants Litig., 334 F. Supp. 2d 690, 695–96 (D.N.J. 2004) (“[T]he political
question doctrine counsels the Court to dismiss this action . . . . If this Court adjudicated
the Complaint, it would do so against the recommendation of the Executive Branch.”).
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important because legal scholarship in this area to date has focused
almost entirely on federal law as applied by federal courts.301
Examining state and foreign law in federal, state, and foreign courts
presents a fresh look at the role of transnational law in domestic
courts and points to future battlegrounds for litigants, courts, and
scholars.
In light of the Morrison and Kiobel decisions, it is likely that
many transnational securities and tort cases will not be subject to suit
in federal court under federal law. Combining this realization with
empirical evidence demonstrating a significant decline in
transnational litigation generally in federal courts,302 as well as the
doctrines discussed above restricting court access in other areas of
federal procedural law, it is arguable that a significant number of
transnational cases will not be litigated in federal court under federal
law. Will these cases simply go away or will they escape federal law
for other law and fora? And, what happens when transnational cases
escape federal law?
As discussed above, in the wake of the Morrison decision,
plaintiffs filed nearly identical state law claims alleging fraud or other
violations of state statutory and common law to escape the limits
imposed on them by federal law.303 Some of these cases were filed in
federal court under diversity jurisdiction,304 while others were filed
directly in state courts.305 Some of these state court cases will, of
course, be subject to removal306 and thus, reenter a federal procedural
system that poses significant obstacles to litigating the case. In those
cases, federal courts will again be asked to adjudicate transnational
cases under U.S. state and foreign law. Will the courts so adjudicate,
or will they use forum non conveniens and other doctrines to short301. See, e.g., Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of
Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 538 (2011);
Alex Reed, But I’m an American! A Text-Based Rationale for Dismissing F-Squared
Securities Fraud Claims After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
515, 515 (2012). But see Florey, supra note 26, at 539 (examining the rise of state law claims
in transnational cases).
302. Whytock, supra note 10, at 510.
303. See Ahn v. C2 Educ. Sys., No. CL–2011–615, 2012 WL 1856475, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct.
2012) (asserting claims in state court under the Virginia Securities Act, which is identical
to section 10(b) of the Exchange Act).
304. See King Cnty., Wash. v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 708 F. Supp. 2d 334,
338 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (pleading common law fraud against securities rating agencies with
respect to ratings for a collapsed structured investment vehicle).
305. Carclucci v. Han, 886 F. Supp. 2d 497, 527–28 (E.D. Va. 2012) (claims under
Virginia Securities Act brought in diversity jurisdiction dismissed due to heightened
pleading standards).
306. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012).
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circuit the plaintiff’s forum shopping? Some cases, however, will not
be subject to removal, and this will thrust U.S. state courts into
transnational securities litigation. Finally, some cases will be filed
abroad,307 either because of dismissals in federal or state court or
because of forum and law shopping. Recent filings in foreign fora
confirm the attractiveness of foreign courts today, even though in the
past plaintiffs were seemingly drawn to U.S. courts “Like Moths To a
Flame.”308
Such an outcome may be appropriate. It might be the case that a
constricted U.S. approach to transnational litigation is in accord with
the original design for the federal courts. Yet, thrusting transnational
cases into state courts risks creating discord in an important area of
international relations that requires the speaking of “one voice” by
the federal government.309 It may also be the case that sending these
cases abroad will have unforeseen consequences. These movements
to escape federal law will push lawmaking powers to other courts.
The impact that this will have on U.S. law, foreign law, and judicial
decisionmaking is in need of examination.
As detailed in the previous parts, there arguably exists a
transnational law market that will impact litigation before federal,
state, and foreign courts. As the exploration of the market’s impact
on securities litigation post-Morrison and on transnational tort
litigation post-Kiobel showed, litigants respond to restrictive federal
and procedural law by seeking out other courts—state and foreign—
and other law—state and foreign—to plead transnational cases. As
litigants seek out other fora, it is to be expected that state and foreign
fora will compete for these cases by opening their doors to litigation
foreclosed in federal court. For instance, while American class action
procedures remain uncommon, many countries have recently adopted
mass aggregation rules that substantially overlap with U.S.
procedures.310 Part of the reason for this change in foreign law might
be that plaintiffs are now seeking out these fora on account of limited
federal law to reach their claims.
307. See, e.g., Abdula v. Canadian Solar, 2011 ONSC 5105 (Can.); Black & Jenkins,
supra note 169.
308. Marco Ventoruzzo, Like Moths to a Flame? International Securities Litigation
After Morrison: Correcting the Supreme Court’s “Transaction Test,” 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 405,
411–15 (2012) (explaining both substantive and procedural reasons that plaintiffs were
drawn to U.S. courts).
309. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976) (“[T]he Federal
Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments.”).
310. See Strong, supra note 35, at 954–60. (describing aggregate litigation in Europe).
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One might also speculate that in future years, foreign law might
adopt remedial and procedural schemes similar to U.S. practice to
accommodate such cases. The evidence points beyond speculation.
First, foreign legal systems are beginning to issue damages awards
that rival, even if they do not surpass, U.S. awards.311 Second, foreign
legal systems have begun to employ aggregate litigation or collective
action mechanisms similar to U.S. class actions.312 Third, foreign
systems now permit alternative litigation funding structures.313 This
development both facilitates transnational litigation in foreign courts
and reflects the growth of high-stakes litigation abroad.314 Finally,
“foreign courts recognize jurisdiction over foreign defendants in ways
that are as expansive or even more so than American courts.”315
Several developments are thus in play. First, foreign courts are
changing their substantive and procedural laws to encourage the
litigation of transnational claims before their courts. Second, these
changes are occurring both at the level of substance and procedure.
Third, there is reason to believe that these cases may in fact end up,
once again, in the United States. Once the plaintiffs secure a
favorable judgment abroad, the plaintiffs may seek enforcement of
the judgment before U.S. courts.316 When reviewing requests for
enforcement, U.S. courts have traditionally employed a confined
approach that does not permit the U.S. court to retry the case.317
Rather, a U.S. court will generally enforce the foreign judgment so
long as there are not systemic, due process, or public policy issues
with judgment enforcement.318 U.S. courts may have closed their
courthouse doors through restricting procedural and substantive law.
311. See KELEMEN, supra note 33, at 74; Behrens et al., supra note 34, at 192–93.
312. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come
to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 202 (2009); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation
Across the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 21–25
(2009).
313. See, e.g., Behrens et al., supra note 34, at 183–87; Robertson, supra note 85, at
161–62.
314. These developments parallel increasing legal costs in Europe. When compared to
European countries or Canada, the United States has “the highest liability costs as a
percentage of GDP,” but “liability costs in the U.K., Germany and Denmark have risen
between 13% and 25% per year since 2008.” DAVID L. MCKNIGHT & PAUL J. HINTON,
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF
LITIGATION COSTS: EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES, AND CANADA 2 (2013), available at
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/NERA_FULL.pdf.
315. Bookman, supra note 236.
316. See Shill, supra note 80, at 462 (explaining the dynamics of enforcement of foreign
judgments).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 493–95.
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To the extent foreign courts respond by developing their substantive
and procedural law to allow such claims, U.S. courts, through
enforcement proceedings, now may become the handmaiden of this
transnational forum shopping through judgment enforcement.
Federal courts cannot close their doors to transnational cases
without having a significant impact on the development of law in
other fora. Traditionally, federal doctrine has had little concern for
the impact that closure has on other fora. Yet, one must ask an
important question at the heart of transnational litigation: Should
U.S. courts make the decision to reject transnational cases without
concern for the impact that will have on the transnational law
market? Failure to consider the impact on the market will risk
unleashing a brave new world of transnational litigation where
litigants demand that courts compete for these cases. The end result
will not only be jurisdictional conflict, but also, perhaps more
problematic, forum competition where fairness and access to justice
are subsumed in a market for law. In the following sections, I propose
a new approach to the transnational law market to take account of
these concerns.
A. Why Are Federal Courts Restricting Access?
Before proposing a different approach, it is helpful to take
account of some of the reasons that U.S. federal courts have
employed the above doctrines to limit access in transnational cases.
There is no doubt that judicial concern with excessive litigation and
case management has driven many of the contractions identified
above, especially those in the context of pleading and class actions.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has restricted federal law because it
questions the expansive costs of litigation.319 The Supreme Court is
319. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (“So when the
allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,
this basic deficiency should be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and
money by the parties and the court.” (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216, at 233–34 (3d ed. 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted))); Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)
(“[Insufficient pleadings] would permit a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim to simply
take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in
terrorem increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonable founded hope that
the discovery process will reveal relevant evidence.” (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Car Carriers,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he costs of modern federal
antitrust litigation and the increasing caseload of the federal courts counsel against
sending the parties into discovery when there is no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs
can construct a claim from the events related in the complaint.”); Asahi Glass Co. v.
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cognizant of the practicalities of litigation, specifically noting three
concerns: discovery is costly, abuse is possible, and settlements are
sometimes unjustified.320 Another reason is judicial efficiency. In the
face of a presumed “docket explosion,” federal courts are increasingly
using procedural mechanisms to limit the cases they ultimately
hear.321 As explained above, one can safely say that there is a general
hesitancy on the part of federal courts to adjudicate not just
transnational cases, but domestic cases also.
Yet, something additional is at work in the specific context of
transnational litigation that better explains the application of these
restrictive doctrines in transnational cases. Courts are reluctant to
interfere with the sovereignty of other nations. Additionally, courts
do not wish to interfere with foreign policy matters for fear of
creating international discord.322 The Court certainly fears engaging in
acts of “legal imperialism” unless specifically directed to do so by the
legislative branch.323
This policy of deference to the political branches in foreign
affairs certainly underlies much of the restrictive transnational
jurisprudence discussed above. For instance, the Court has revitalized
the presumption against extraterritoriality to ensure that it will only
engage in international conflicts when explicitly directed to do so by
Congress.324 By limiting foreign plaintiffs’ access to federal courts
through the presumption against extraterritoriality and other
procedural doctrines, the Court has also accomplished the goal of
limiting judicial interference in international affairs. Yet, as discussed
above, this contraction will shunt transnational cases to state and
foreign law and state and foreign courts. As state and foreign courts

Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (Posner, J., sitting by
designation) (“[S]ome threshold of plausibility must be crossed at the outset before a
patent antitrust case should be permitted to go into its inevitably costly and protracted
discovery phase.”).
320. See Dura Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 347; Arthur Miller, Are the Federal
Courthouse Doors Closing? What’s Happened to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, 43
TEX. TECH L. REV. 587, 597 (2011).
321. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Access to Justice Within the Federal Courts—A Ninth
Circuit Perspective, 90 OR. L. REV. 1033, 1047–49 (2012) (“Rather than being able to
assimilate those changes in caseload, just to keep their heads above water, the federal
courts have been forced to rely increasingly on procedural mechanisms.”).
322. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (“The
presumption against extraterritorial application helps ensure that the Judiciary does not
erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences
not clearly intended by the political branches.”).
323. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004).
324. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 256–57 (2010).
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hear these cases, new issues will arise that will create the potential for
international discord.325
B.

The Need for a Different Approach

In this section, the Article briefly outlines a new approach to the
transnational law market based on sovereign interests. As explained
above, a significant reason for the restriction of federal court access in
transnational cases has to do with the perceived impact on foreign
sovereign interests and international relations. This approach that
follows aims to enlist courts and policy makers as active participants
in a transnational legal system that takes account of the transnational
law market by regulatory coordination as opposed to federal judicial
abstention and transnational forum shopping.
1. A Sovereign-Interest Approach
As a matter of policy, it is arguable that the restrictive ethos
discussed above is being applied in transnational cases in order to
avoid “unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of
other
nations.”326
Much
like
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality, restricting federal court access in transnational
cases generally “serves to protect against unintended clashes between
our laws and those of other nations which could result in international
discord.”327 The “primary source of that conflict is differences in
substance between the law applied and the law of the other country
or countries involved, particularly when conduct permitted where it
occurred is prohibited where it has effect.”328
The key functional concerns are as follows. First, there is a
concern that litigating transnational cases in U.S. courts might
interfere with other, foreign measures to regulate or address the harm
in question. Second, there appears to be some concern that private
lawsuits may be inappropriate means to pursue the regulatory and
public policy goals of much transnational litigation.
The key to resolving these functional concerns is to refocus the
court-access doctrines discussed above on state consent. To do this,
courts should seek to determine the precise sovereign interests at
325. According to Pamela Bookman, these doctrines have done little to accomplish
their stated goals and may in fact have negative implications for U.S. parties—both
plaintiff and defendant—as well as U.S. sovereign interests. Bookman, supra note 236.
326. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, 542 U.S. at 164.
327. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
328. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 251,
270 (2006).
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stake by seeking the input of the sovereigns implicated by a court’s
decision.329 Such an approach would encourage coordination between
the United States and foreign sovereigns and has the potential to
minimize externalities created by the transnational law market.
First, one way to accomplish this goal is to narrow a plaintiff’s
jurisdictional choices. One reason that the transnational law market
encouraged the filing of suits in the United States was the perception
that U.S. law permitted expansive assertions of jurisdictions. As noted
above, other legal systems may now permit similarly expansive
jurisdiction. Restricting jurisdictional choice has largely been
accomplished in the United States through the Supreme Court’s
recent general jurisdiction decisions that require a transnational
defendant to be “at home” in the United States. In so doing, the
Supreme Court has made it possible as a matter of jurisdiction to
bring transnational cases only against U.S. defendant domiciliaries,
unless there is specific jurisdiction over a foreign defendant
domiciliary. This approach does much to permit assertions of
jurisdiction in the United States only when there is a substantial
connection with the United States and the given forum for suit.
However, such an approach will only work if other countries
adopt similar rules. As noted above, foreign legal systems may be
expanding their jurisdictional rules even beyond what has been
regarded as relatively permissive U.S. jurisdictional doctrines. Yet,
there may be potential for regulatory cooperation.
The Brussels I Regulation Recast provides a useful example.
Under the Regulation, the starting principle is that a defendant
domiciled in a contracting state should generally be sued in the courts
of that state.330 Domiciliaries of contracting states may only be sued in
the courts of other contracting states if one of the Regulation rules
permits.331 For example, the permissible bases of jurisdiction are such
that in matters of contract the suit may be brought in the place of
performance.332 In matters of tort, suit may be brought where the
harmful act occurred.333 This is understood as covering both the place
where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to

329. See id. at 308–09 (“For transnational litigation to become an effective element in
global economic regulation, the consent of the other countries involved . . . is necessary.”).
330. Regulation 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), art. 4, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 7.
331. Id. at art. 5, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 7.
332. Id. at art. 7, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 7.
333. Id.
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it. In respect to disputes arising out of the operation of a branch office
or agency, suit may proceed in the place where the branch or agency
is located.334 And in actions in rem, the state where the property is
located has exclusive jurisdiction.335 Under these rules, contracting
states are prohibited from exercising judicial jurisdiction against
domiciliaries of other contracting states on exorbitant bases.
Based on these provisions, it can be said that the acceptable
bases for adjudicatory jurisdiction are domicile, consent, acts or
effects occurring in the nation, and ownership or possession of
property.
It is important to note that these jurisdictional rules only apply to
defendants domiciled in European Union member states. For suits
against non-member-state-party domiciliaries, the law of the state
where the suit is brought determines.336 Thus, additional regulatory
cooperation is needed to both model the approach of the Brussels I
Regulation Recast, as well as to fill holes left for non-member-stateparty domiciliaries.
Second, further governmental involvement in transnational cases
could be encouraged. Such involvement should be encouraged and
solicited by courts and parties in transnational cases.337 By
encouraging this involvement, courts and parties will recognize and
embrace the fact that disputes between private litigants have
important ramifications for sovereign interests as well as public
policy.338 Courts can better address these functional concerns by
encouraging sovereigns to precisely explain their interests in
transnational cases. There should be a strong presumption that courts
will apply forum law and exercise jurisdiction in transnational cases
absent compelling and articulated sovereign concerns to the contrary.
As extensions of the forum sovereign, courts should be reluctant to
shirk the obligation to apply forum law.339 Likewise, courts should be
cautious about needlessly relinquishing jurisdiction given that there is

334. Id.
335. Id. at art. 24, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 10.
336. See id. at art. 5, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 7.
337. In addition to statements of interest and briefs, the U.S. government, as well as
foreign governments, sometimes file letters with courts regarding pending cases. See, e.g.,
First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 764–65 (1972) (plurality
opinion).
338. Horatia Muir Watt, Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets: A
Matter of Political Economy, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 383, 404 (2003).
339. See Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1015 (1991)
(“Judges are, after all, agents of the state’s citizenry and lawmakers, and their paramount
responsibility must be the implementation of the state’s own law.”).
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a “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise a court’s jurisdiction in
cases before them.340 Courts should, of course, be concerned with the
nuanced international relations issues present in specific transnational
cases. But such a concern should not encourage a court at the first
instance to disregard the necessity of ascertaining the precise
sovereign interests at stake in its exercise of jurisdiction.
2. Outcomes
The primary outcome of the above approach would be the
encouragement of courts to explicitly describe their reasons for
adjudicating transnational cases in such a way that illuminates the
sovereign interests at stake. In so doing, the democratic-enhancing
function of the judicial process is brought to the forefront of judicial
decisionmaking. Courts have important democratic functions to carry
out as extensions of the sovereign and, in the case of the United
States, of the people for whom the sovereign speaks. Through this
approach, courts, parties, and sovereigns will be prevented from
obscuring complex issues of international relations behind the
nomenclature of law. The sovereign interests at stake will be sought
and articulated and the democratic branches of government will be
provided with an important check on judicial decision-making in
transnational cases. Likewise, the public grappling with these
important issues will perhaps encourage further democratic activity,
such as congressional action in important areas of transnational
litigation that touches on international relations. Finally, this
approach has the potential to mitigate concerns present in the
transnational law market by replacing litigant demand and forum
competition with sovereign interests.
CONCLUSION
This Article has described and analyzed a brave new world of
transnational litigation where litigants forum shop for favorable law
as fora compete for legal cases. Reconceptualizing transnational
litigation as a transnational law market enables one to see the myriad
ways in which procedural and substantive law enable and frustrate
forum choice in transnational cases. Viewed in this light, decisions by
U.S. federal courts to limit transnational cases must be viewed not
only for the effect that such rules have domestically in federal courts,
but also in terms of the likely impact they will have on the filing of
340. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976).
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cases under state and foreign law in state and foreign courts. Forum
choice and competition impact these cases, and additional scrutiny
should be given to whether jurisdictional constriction on the part of
U.S. federal courts is appropriate in light of the transnational law
market identified above. Furthermore, courts, legislators, and
governments should begin to examine the possibilities for
transnational regulatory cooperation with specific regard for the
sovereign interests at stake in many transnational cases.
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